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1 Introduction
Starting from the seminal work by Grossman (1972) economists have applied the life-
cycle model to examine how individuals allocate health care and consumption over
their life course and what this implies for their health status, mortality and ultimately
longevity (e.g. Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Ehrlich, 2000). A related line of literature
employs life-cycle models to assess an individual’s willingness to pay for survival - the
value of life - and how it evolves over the life-course (e.g. Shepard and Zeckhauser, 1984;
Rosen, 1988; Johansson, 2002; Murphy and Topel, 2006). Both strands of literature
typically take a positive approach, i.e. they examine the determinants of individual
health care choices and valuations but do not question their eﬃciency. In most of the
models eﬃcient life-cycle choices are guaranteed anyway, as the individual (i) faces
perfect markets, in particular, a perfect annuity market, and (ii) acts as an isolated
decision-maker who is not linked to other individuals (contemporary or future).1 In
the real world neither of the (implicit) assumptions in (i) and (ii) is likely to hold.
Markets are typically imperfect or even missing, in case of which externalities may
arise. Likewise individuals are linked to others through altruistic ties but also through
externalities, the problematic case from an eﬃciency perspective. Thus, eﬃciency is by
no means guaranteed. In this paper, we seek to shed some light on the implication of
intra- and intergenerational externalities on the eﬃciency of the life-cycle choices over
health care and consumption as well as on the underlying valuations. Speciﬁcally, we
focus on the eﬀects of spill-overs related to medical spending.2
Typically, individual mortality not only depends on the individual’s own consump-
tion of health care but also on the level of aggregate ’activity’ within a health care
system. One could think of a number of ways in which aggregate activity may either
enhance or compromise an individual’s eﬀorts to reduce mortality. First, medical re-
search has identiﬁed a positive relationship between volume of (surgical) activity and
outcomes, frequently measured by (lower) mortality (for an overview see Phillips and
Luft, 1997). Thus, the eﬀectiveness of individual health consumption increases in ag-
gregate activity. Conversely, by contributing towards aggregate activity an individual
1Note, however, a number of important departures from these assumptions: (i) Shepard and Zeck-
hauser (1984), Ehrlich (2000) and Johansson (2002) examine the case in which individuals do not have
access to an annuity market. (ii) Basu and Meltzer (2005) examine a model in which the individual
cares for a contemporary family-member (partner), whereas Birchenall and Soares (2008) and Kuhn
et al. (2010) allow for altruism towards descendants.
2The case of imperfect annuity markets is analysed by e.g. Davies and Kuhn (1992) and Philipson
and Becker (1998).
2also enhances the eﬀectiveness of health care targeted at others. As long as these bene-
ﬁts are not internalised in the price of care - and there is no reason to believe they are,
whatever the pricing arrangements - such spillovers constitute a positive externality.
Second, in as far as the provision of health care contains public good aspects, such
as the provision of medical facilities, hospital bed capacity or emergency services, higher
levels of aggregate health care spending may translate into a lower mortality risk at
individual level. Similarly, higher aggregate spending levels may lead to greater scope
for medical R&D or other quality enhancing activities that would not be lucrative in
’low spending’ health care systems.3
Third, positive spillovers typically arise in the context of preventive activities. The
most obvious example relates to vaccination, where individual mortality decreases in
the degree to which the population is vaccinated against an infectious disease. (for an
overview see Philipson, 2000). The same applies to antimicrobial treatment of infec-
tious disease, which being curative from the individual’s perspective prevents further
infections. Other preventive activities that lower both own and other people’s mortality
include the installation of safety devices such as Anti Lock Breaking in automobiles or
ﬁre detectors in tenement ﬂats.
Finally, we may think of measures related to public health such as the cleaning of
sewerage, proper disposal of household waste or the reduction of air pollution. Cutler
and Miller (2005), for instance, show that in the early 20th century nearly half of the
total mortality reductions in major US cities can be attributed to the introduction of
clean-water technologies, i.e. the ﬁltration and chlorination of water supplies.4 ’Pure’
public health measures constitute a polar case, where there is a negligble eﬀect on
mortality of individual health care expenditure and all mortality reductions are due to
cumulative expenditure.5 Such a situation is equivalent to a public goods problem. But
even in less extreme cases, the problem of private underprovision arises as long as a part
of private health expenditure ﬂows towards a public good (i.e. communal reductions in
mortality).6
All of the above examples relate to positive spillovers, where higher activity trans-
lates into lower mortality. However, in a number of circumstances the converse may be
true: aggregate activity may increase individual mortality. Negative spillovers could
3Murphy and Topel (2007), for instance, model an R&D race for a pharmaceutical innovation and
show that the overall probability of innovation increases in the share of the social value that the winning
ﬁrm is able to capture. In our model the prize for innovation would correspond to the winner’s share
of aggregate health expenditure, thus establishing a link between aggregate health expenditure and
individual mortality.
4Watson (2006) studies the impact of public sanitation interventions in US Indian Reservations
on the child mortality of Native Americans in the US as opposed to White infants. She ﬁnds that
they were quite eﬀective in reducing the mortality gap despite a seizable externality on the health of
neighbouring White children.
5Easterlin (1999) argues that, indeed, most of the historical reductions in mortality due to preventive
measures, vaccination and antimicrobials are not attributable to the market for reason of various forms
of externalities.
6An alternative but analogous interpretation is one in which health care is a good with (positive)
network externalities.
3arise from congestion eﬀects or from microbial resistance against antibiotics. Excessive
levels of health care demand may lead to congestion in the presence of capacity con-
straints. Hospital crowding, for instance, is likely to hike up mortality due to increased
infection risks or due to over-stretched clinical staﬀ lowering the attention aﬀorded to
the care of each individual patient and being more prone to committing medical er-
rors.7 Moreover, it is well known that microbes (bacteria and viruses) tend to develop
resistance against antimicrobial treatments. The probability that a resistant micro-
bial strain develops increases in the level of exposure. Thus, assuming that health
expenditure ﬂows into the purchase of antimicrobial treatments, then individual use of
antibiotics tends to curb individual mortality but may, in aggregate, lead to an increased
mortality risk due to microbial resistance.8 In the case of negative spillovers, there is a
tendency towards excessive consumption of care. The empirical relevance of all of the
above mechanisms has been well documented (in the literature referenced). While we
are unaware of empirical evidence as to the distortionary eﬀects of these spillovers on
the level and pattern of individual health expenditure, in the light of their prominence,
we would expect these eﬀects to be of a non-trivial magnitude.
The general implications of these externalities - under- (over-)consumption of health
care in the case of positive (negative) externalities - being straightforward enough, the
life-cycle aspects of the problem are more intricate. First, a distinct life-cycle pattern
of health care spending translates into a distinct pattern at which externalities are
generated. Second, through its inﬂuence on mortality and ultimately life expectancy
the externality generates an important feedback eﬀect. This is because changes in life
expectancy have a bearing on the individual’s aggregate wealth and on the need to
spread this wealth over a longer or shorter life-span. Third, the extent / value of the
externality is endogenous as it depends on the size and age-structure of the population
as determined by the mortality within each age-group. Finally, a transfer policy aimed
at internalising the spill-overs needs to reﬂect the above properties, therefore giving rise
to a particular age-schedule of the transfer.
We analyse these issues by combining two variants of a life-cycle model with endoge-
nous mortality, depending both on indivdiual health expenditure and on a measure of
aggregate health expenditure:
1. an age structured optimal control model, where a social planner maximises welfare
at population level (i.e. individual utilities aggregated over time and age groups).
This model determines the socially optimal pattern of consumption and health
expenditure.
2. a ’conventional’ life-cycle model, where an individual maximizes life-time util-
7Black and Pearson (2002) discuss the problems related with a recent bout in hospital congestion in
the UK. Naylor et al. (1993) examine the management of a spell of serious excess demand for coronary
surgery in Ontario (1987-1988). They ﬁnd wide discrepancies in management processes across hospitals
and identify large ineﬃciencies.
8Easterlin (1999) discusses evidence on the excessive use of antimicrobial treatments in a number
of developing countries.
4ity. This model determines the individual pattern of consumption and health
expenditure.
Solving and simulating models (1) and (2) and comparing the respective patterns of
consumption and health care spending we can deduce conclusions about the ineﬃcien-
cies in individual behavior and for which age-groups they arise due to the externality.
We derive value of life expressions for the two models, a comparison of which allows
to pinpoint the age-speciﬁc degree of ineﬃciency. Furthermore, we combine the two
models in order to derive a transfer scheme that, if targeted at the individual, restores
the ﬁrst-best allocation.
To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to integrate externalities into a life-cycle model
with endogenous survival.9 As will emerge, this is no trivial undertaking if the spillovers
extend across diﬀerent age-groups (or, indeed, cohorts) at any given point in time.
By their very nature, the analysis and evaluation of such eﬀects requires a model of
the full population, such as given by model (1), and therefore stretches beyond what
could be achieved within an individual life-cycle model alone. The latter allows to
analyse the behaviour of a given cohort along the time path.10 However, by construction
individual life-cycle models are not amenable to an analysis of cross-cohort eﬀects. Our
approach provides a consistent and tractable way of analysing such eﬀects. Technically,
the age-structured control model (1) diﬀers from the life-cycle model (2) in that the
control variables - consumption and health expenditure - and state variables - assets
and population size / survival probability - vary in two dimensions - age and time -
instead of a single dimension age = time.11 The distinction can be illustrated with
reference to the Lexis-diagram in Figure 1, depicting the life experience of cohorts in
time versus age. The 45-degree line represents cohort lines (e.g. a cohort born at t−a
is of age s at time t − a + s).
[Figure 1 about here]
Individual life-cycle maximisation follows the cohort line disregarding other cohorts.
The planner, in contrast, maximises over the whole Lexis-diagramm. In the presence of
spillovers, individual mortality develops along the cohort line not only according to the
individual’s health spending h(a) alone but also according to the health spending h(b a),
9Philipson and Mechoulan (2003) consider positive vs. negative consumption externalities related
to a (pharmaceutical) product. While they consider the dynamic impact of internalising policies on
R&D incentives, they do not consider a life-cycle framework. Bolin et al. (2002) consider a life-cycle
setting where both an employee and an employer invest into the employee’s health, which in turn
aﬀects her productivity. The resulting Nash-equilibrium is plagued by free-riding. Their set-up diﬀers
from ours as (i) life-expectany is ﬁxed and exogenous; (ii) population structure plays no role; (iii) they
do not derive an optimal policy.
10It is thus ﬁt e.g. to analyse the life-cycle eﬀects of missing annuity markets as in Shepard and
Zeckhauser (1984) or Ehrlich (2000).
11Hall and Jones (2007) consider a discrete time formulation of an age-structured life-cycle model
in order to simulate the development of health care-spending in the US. Their objective being very
diﬀerent, they do not consider externalities. Neither do they compare individual and social choices.
5b a  = a realised by other cohorts at each point in time, t. The ﬁrst best result cannot be
attained by individuals without correcting policy-measures.
Our main results are as follows. Unsurprisingly, the presence of positive (nega-
tive) spillovers implies that individuals spend too little (much) on health care and
consequently consume too much (little). The divergence between individual and social
incentives is rendered evident in the social as compared to the private value of health
spending. Individuals value the purchase of additional health care according to their
private value of life (i.e. the discounted value of their expected remaining life-time). In
contrast, the planner values additional health spending by the social value of life plus
the value of the externality (i.e. the total value of mortality changes for the rest of the
society induced by the individual’s current health expenditure). The social value of an
individual’s life diverges from the private value of life. This is because it incorporates
the value of spillovers generated by the health expenditure of the individual over its
remaining life-time. This constitutes a generalisation of the value of life to incorporate
externalities.12
We derive the age speciﬁc optimal transfer rate that fully internalises the spillover
and achievs an eﬃcient allocation of consumption and health expenditures over the
life cycle. Expressed as an ad-valorem subsidy/tax on health expenditure (with the
resulting budget balance being reimbursed in a lump-sum fashion), the optimal transfer
rate amounts to the proportion of the external value of health spending (current and
future induced through the individual’s survival) relative to its total value (including
in addition the private value of life).
Finally, our numerical analysis reveals an interesting asymmetry between positive
and negative spillovers. If spillovers remain uncompensated, the ineﬃcient under-
spending leads to a signiﬁcant reduction in life-expectancy. Individual under-spending
implies higher mortality as both too little is spent on individual survival (a direct eﬀect)
and too low a value of spillovers is generated (an indirect eﬀect). In contrast, the inef-
ﬁciency in the presence of negative spillovers leaves life expectancy broadly unaﬀected.
On the one hand, over-spending leads to a direct reduction in individual mortality;
on the other hand, it boosts mortality due to the negative spillovers. The result is a
tread-mill eﬀect, where individual eﬀorts to curb mortality are neutralised, leading to
a pure loss of consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the model.
In section 3, we derive the social optimum and characterise the social value of life.
Individual choice is analysed in section 4 where we present the individual optimum and
then establish the transfer scheme that internalises the spillovers and induces the ﬁrst-
best allocation. In section 5 we present numerical simulations to support the analytical
results. The ﬁnal section oﬀers a discussion and outlook for further research.
12Birchenall and Soares (2008) and Kuhn et al. (2010) provide another generalisation, where the
value of progeny is incorporated in the value of life.
62 The Model
The dynamics of the population is described by the McKendrick equation (see Keyﬁtz
and Keyﬁtz (1997))
Na + Nt = −µ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t))N(a,t) N(0,t) = B(t),N(a,0) = N0(a). (1)
The state variable N(a,t) represents the number of a-year old individuals at time t.
The age speciﬁc mortality rate µ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t)) depends on age a and can be reduced
instantaneously by providing to the individual an age speciﬁc amount h(a,t) of health
care (or other health enhancing goods and services). Here, h(a,t) is an age-structured
control variable in our model. Individual mortality also depends on health care spending
at population level, ¯ H(t). N0(a) describes the initial age distribution of the population
and B(t) equals the exogenous number of newborns at time t.
We assume that the mortality rate µ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t)) is a strictly concave function
in h and ¯ H, saytisfying an Inada condition with regard to h.13 Speciﬁcally, we assume
µ(a, ,0) ≤ ˜ µ(a) (∀a); µ(a,0,0) = ˜ µ(a) (∀a)
µh( ) < 0,µhh( ) > 0; µh(a,0,0) = −∞ (∀a),
where ˜ µ(a) is the “natural” mortality rate resulting without any health care. Mortality
cannot be worsened by investing in own health. We assume that the mortality rate
depends on the aggregate level of health care, as measured by per capita consumption
of health care ¯ H(t), (averaged across the full population) at time t.14 The impact of
aggregate activity on mortality, i.e. µ ¯ H(a,h, ¯ H) :=
∂µ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t))
∂ ¯ H(t) , is negative in the case
of a positive externality (greater life-cycle utility through lower mortality) and positive
in the case of a negative externality (lower life-cycle utility through higher mortality).











denoting aggregate consumption of health care and total population at time t respec-
tively. Here, ω is the maximal age an individual can reach. Aggregate health ex-
penditure for age-group a at time t is given by the sum of individual expenditure,
h(a,t)N(a,t) =
R N(a,t)
0 hi(a,t)di. The impact of individual spending on average health
expenditure is then given by
∂ ¯ H(t)
∂hi(a,t) = 1
˜ N(t) which tends to zero for large populations.
13Thus the usual assumption of nonnegative health investments is not necessary.
14We use per capita consumption of health care in order to exclude scale eﬀects as drivers of our
results. We should stress, however, that the use of total consumption of health care as a measure of
aggregate activity would not yield qualitatively diﬀerent results.
7Thus, individuals rationally anticipate that they are unable to inﬂuence aggregate
spending and an externality arises.
The second control variable is consumption c(a,t). The nonnegativity assumption
is trivially fulﬁlled, as we assume limc→0+ uc(c) = +∞ for the utility function. The
objective of the social planner is to maximize social welfare, deﬁned as the sum of the






−ρtu(c(a,t))N(a,t) da dt. (3)
The function u(c(a,t)) represents the per capita instantaneous utility, which depends
only on consumption and is assumed to be concave in its argument. The parameter ρ
denotes the rate of time preference. Note that we also allow for an inﬁnite planning
horizon T = +∞ at this stage.
Finally we assume a budget constraint that is balanced for each cohort. This is
expressed by the introduction of the total wealth A(a,t) held by age-group a at time t
and the following dynamics:
Aa + At = rA(a,t) + (y(a) − c(a,t) − h(a,t))N(a,t)
A(0,t) = A(ω,t) = 0 ∀t
A(a,0) = A0(a),A(a,T) = AT(a) ∀a (4)
Here, r denotes the interest rate, assumed to be exogenous to the economy, and y(a)
denotes an exogenous income (net of the returns to capital) accruing to an a-year
old individual. We assume that health care is purchased at a relative price that is
normalized to one. h(a,t) therefore denotes both individual consumption of health care
and health expenditure. Each cohort is assumed to hold zero assets at the time of birth
and death. By guaranteeing that each cohort spends precisely its own production, the
cohort speciﬁc budget constraint allows us to compare steady-state allocations derived
for the social planner with allocations derived for the individual (see section 4). We
thus rule out diﬀerences in total spending across cohorts which are due to discrepancies
between the rate of time preference and the interest rate. Consider a situation where
budgets are pooled across all cohorts. If ρ > r, for instance, the social planner would
then not only (i) shift consumption to the beginning of the planning horizon for each
individual cohort, but also (ii) shift consumption from future cohorts to present cohorts.
Intuitively, we would like to account for shifts in consumption within cohorts (i) but not
across cohorts (ii). Such an allocation rule also bears some intuitive appeal on equity
grounds. Moreover, in the current paper we focus on the externality in survival. The
eﬀects related to such externalities can be isolated more clearly when there are as few
as possible confounding eﬀects.
15If chosen large enough the ﬁxed upper limit to life time ω is no restriction to the model. In
some approaches ω is variable or a decision variable (e.g. Boucekkine et al., 2004; Ehrlich and Chuma,
1990). In our model endogenous life-exptecancy emerges through the age-dependent mortality schedule
µ(a,h,H).
8The problem for the social planner is then to choose the age speciﬁc schedule of con-
sumption and health expenditure (health care) to maximize the sum of instantaneous
utility of all individuals. Formally, this is represented by the following dynamic age-
structured optimization problem with state variables A(a,t) and N(a,t) and control









s.t. Na + Nt = −µ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t))N(a,t)
N(0,t) = B(t), N(a,0) = N0(a)
Aa + At = rA(a,t) + (y(a) − c(a,t) − h(a,t))N(a,t)
A(0,t) = A(ω,t) = 0 ∀t














Both parameters, time t and age a, are ﬁnite in our model, since in general no transver-
sality conditions are available for age-structured optimal control models for inﬁnite
parameters. However, as discussed earlier this is no restriction to the model. In the fol-
lowing section we derive and interpret the necessary optimality conditions of the above
age speciﬁc control problem.
3 The social optimum
To obtain necessary optimality conditions we apply the maximum principle for age-
structured control models (Feichtinger et al., 2003). We deﬁne the Hamiltonian of the
social welfare problem as follows:17
H = u(c)N − ξ
Nµ(a,h, ¯ H)N + ξ
A(rA + (y − c − h)N) + η
HhN + η
˜ NN (7)
where we denote the adjoint variables that correspond to the state variables as follows:
ξN(a,t) refers to age-group N(a,t), ξA(a,t) refers to assets A(a,t), ηH(t) refers to total
16A similar modelling approach is pursued in Saglam and Veliov (2008) on maintenance and endoge-
nous depreciation, Feichtinger et al. (2006) on capital replacement by ﬁrms or Prskawetz and Veliov
(2007) on intertemporal labour demand and training.
17From now on we omit a and t if they are not of particular importance.
9health expenditure H(t), and η
˜ N(t) refers to total population e N(t). A full derivation
of the social optimum can be found in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A. Here,
we restrain ourselves to reporting the necessary ﬁrst order conditions with respect to
consumption and health expenditure:
Hc = uc(c)N − ξ
AN = 0 (8)
Hh = −ξ
Nµh(a,h, ¯ H)N − ξ
AN + η
HN = 0 (9)
Combining them we obtain
uc(c) = −ξ
Nµh(a,h, ¯ H) + η
H. (10)
Condition (8) governs the distribution of consumption over the life-cycle.18 Condi-
tion (10) governs the choice of health expenditure. The LHS gives the foregone welfare
(per capita) in marginal utility terms if health spending is increased by one unit for each
member of age-group a at time t. As usual, ξN can be interpreted as a shadow price,
indicating the increase of the value function (i.e. social welfare) for a small (marginal)
increase of N(a,t). In other words, ξN gives the social value in utility terms of an indi-
vidual, implying a marginal social beneﬁt of −ξNµh due to life-saving. The second term
on the RHS in (10), ηH, represents the value of the externality generated by a marginal
increase in health expenditure, where ηH > (<)0 for positive (negative) externalities.
We can calculate the value of life as the willingness to pay for a small reduction
of the mortality rate for age a at time t. To our knowledge this concept was ﬁrstly
developed in a formal manner by Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) (see also Rosen,
1988; and Johansson, 2002) who apply it to an isolated individual decision-maker. In
the presence of cross-cohort spillovers, a distinction needs to be made between the
private and social value of life (PVOL and SVOL respectively). Denoting by V the













We can then express the optimality condition in value terms as follows (a proof is given
in Appendix A).














µ ¯ H(b a,h, ¯ H)
µh(a,h, ¯ H)
db a, (13)






′−a), the usual condition for optimal saving.
10i.e. it equates the eﬀective marginal cost, −1
µh(a,h, ¯ H), of saving the life of an individual
aged a at time t to the SVOL for this individual plus the value of the externality, Θ(a,t),
related to the provision of care to an individual at age a and time t.
Before characterising further the SVOL let us turn to the value of the externality
Θ(a,t), which is determined by the following factors: (i) the weighted sum over age-
groups of the SVOL’s for (b a,t) individuals, where the population share
N(b a,t)
˜ N(t) is used
as weight; (ii) the relative eﬀectiveness in reducing mortality of aggregate spending for
(b a,t) individuals as given by
µ ¯ H(b a,h, ¯ H)
µh(a,h, ¯ H); and (iii) a conversion factor
uc(c(b a,t))
uc(c(a,t)).19 Obvi-
ously, Θ(a,t) > (<)0 if and only if µ ¯ H( ) < (>)0, impyling that positive (negative)
externalities translate into a positive (negative) value. The absolute value of an exter-
nality is then large if the spillovers are particularly eﬀective (high
￿ ￿ ￿
µ ¯ H(b a,h, ¯ H)
µh(a,h, ¯ H)
￿ ￿ ￿) for large
age groups (high
N(b a,t)
˜ N(t) ) composed of members with a high SVOL.
The following Lemma, which is proved in Appendix B, provides a further charac-
terisation of SVOL.















u(c(s,t − a + s))
uc(c(s,t − a + s))
+ (y(s) − c(s,t − a + s) − h(s,t − a + s)) (15)












×(h(s,t − a + s) − H(t − a + s))
#
ds. (16)
The planner’s valuation of an individual life thus comprises both the PVOL, count-
ing directly towards social welfare, and the value she attaches to the individual’s future
contributions to the externalities. Here, the PVOL consists of the (discounted) net
private value of the individual’s life years as deﬁned in (15) summed up over the indi-
vidual’s remaining life-course. The net private value of a life year consists of (i) gross
consumer surplus
u(c( ))
uc(c( )) and (ii) the individual’s net savings y( ) − c( ) − h( ). The
PVOL corresponds precisely to the measure derived in individual life-cycle models (e.g.
Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen (1988) or Johansson (2002)). In addition, the
planer accounts for the individual’s (net) contribution towards social welfare through
19If consumption is equalised across age-groups then the conversion factor equals one.
11the spillovers from individual consumption of health care. The discounted value of these
contributions Ω(a,t), again summed over the individual’s remaining life course, is thus
the second component of the SVOL.
The value of the individual’s remaining contributions amounts to the (discounted)
sum over future life years of the net spending relative to the average health expenditure
weighted with the share of the value of the externality, Θ, relative to the full social value
of health care, ψS+Θ. Thus, Ω(a,t) depends on the following factors: (i) remaining life
expectancy; (ii) the individual’s net contribution to the externality, as measured by the
diﬀerence between the individual’s age-speciﬁc spending and the population average
h(s,t − a + s) > H(t − a + s), which increases (depresses) Ω(a,t) in case of positive




the sign of which depends on the nature of the externality and which increases in abso-
lute value with the strength of the externality
µ ¯ H(b a,h, ¯ H)
µh(a,h, ¯ H). Thus, there is a social premium
(discount) to the private value of life in the case of positive (negative) externalities.
Finally, substituting into (12) we can describe the socially optimal choice of health




P(a,t) + Ω(a,t) + Θ(a,t). (18)
Thus, the planner’s full valuation of health care (set equal to the eﬀective cost of saving
a life −1
µh( )) amounts to the sum of the private value of life, the value of the individual’s
future contributions towards the externality and the current value of the externality,
as generated by current health care spending. In the following section, we will use this
expression to compare the social incentive with the private incentive. Before that, we
examine the dynamics of the system.
The optimal paths of consumption and health expenditure can be described as
follows. The change in the consumption of a cohort born at t − a is given by20
ca + ct =
uc(c)
ucc(c)
(ρ − r) (19)
and reﬂects the usual life-cycle distribution of consumption. If the discount rate, ρ,
equals the interest rate, r, the right hand side (RHS) is zero implying consumption
smoothing over the whole life for each cohort. If ρ > r consumption will decrease over
the life-cycle, reﬂecting the impatience of individuals. The opposite applies for r > ρ.
20The expresssion is obtained by calculating the directional derivative of (8) and using (34) from the
Appendix.
12In Appendix C we derive the change in health expenditure over time and age as
ha + ht = −
µha + µh ¯ H ¯ Ht






























The change in health expenditure can be decomposed into three eﬀects. (i) describes
the change in the marginal eﬀectiveness of health expenditure due to the individual’s
progressing age µha and due to changes over time of the aggregate health expenditure
µh ¯ H ¯ Ht. Recalling that µhh > 0 (implying decreasing returns to health care spending
at any given age) it follows that health expenditure tends to increase directly with age
as long as the marginal eﬀectiveness of health spending increases with age µha < 0.
Typically, this tends to be true for ages up to the 60-70s with health expenditure
having little impact on mortality before the onset of life-threatening conditions. For
the highest ages health expenditure is likely to become less eﬀective in combatting
mortality so that µha ≥ 0. The impact of an increase in aggregate expenditure depends
on the nature of the externality. Obviously, if aggregate expenditure raises (lowers)
the eﬀectiveness of individual spending, this should lead to an increase (depression) of
individual expenditure.21
(ii) describes the impact of a change in the SVOL. Indeed, as we show in Appendix C




ψS . On the one hand, SVOL increases at the
eﬀective interest rate r +µ; on the other hand, it falls as with the passing of a life year
the social value of this year, v +
ηH
uc (h − ¯ H), is lost. Note that the social value of each
life year is made up of the private value v as deﬁned in (15) and the social value of the
individual’s current net contribution to the externality. The latter amounts to the (net)




deﬁned in (17).22 Noting that −
µh
µhh > 0, it follows that an overall increase (decrease)
in SVOL tends to raise (depress) individual health expenditure over time.
(iii) describes the impact on health expenditure of a change over time of the relative












. The relative value of the externality increases
with the rate of change of the shadow price ηH and changes with consumption over time
and age. Here, an increase in consumption with age, as for ρ < r, implies a reduction in
the marginal utility of consumption uc, thus rendering the externality relatively more
valuable (as opposed to consumption). Consider, for instance, 1
µhhψS
ηH
uc( ) > 0 as is
21Examples are learning-by-doing, where the eﬀectiveness of individual surgery increases with aggre-
gate activity; and microbial resistence, where the eﬀectiveness of individual pharmaceutical treatment
is reduced. Indeed, one would then expect individual expenditure to be raised in the former case and
to be lowered in the latter.
22The identity is readily veriﬁed from the second equality in (37) in the Appendix.
13typical for positive externalities. Then, health expenditure tends to increase with age
if the value of the externality increases over time or if consumption increases with age,
as for ρ < r.
4 Individual Choice and Optimal Transfer Policy
In this section we derive the indivdiual life-cycle choices of health care and consumption
and compare them with the social optimum. In contrast to the planner’s problem, age
and time are identical from the individual’s perspective. We therefore, express the
progression of time/age by the index a and use the identity, t ≡ t0 +a, where t0 stands
for the year of birth in order to index the time dependent level of (average) health care
expenditure ¯ H(t0+a). All variables and underlying functions are as deﬁned previously.
For the moment consider a set-up in which individual life-cycle choices are not aﬀected
by a (correcting) policy.
We follow Yaari (1965) in considering a set-up in which individuals can fully annui-
tise their wealth by trading actuarial notes at some gross interest r+µ(a,h(a), ¯ H(t0+a)).
Hence, individual wealth develops according to
˙ A(a) = (r + µ(a,h(a), ¯ H(t0 + a)))A(a) + y(a) − c(a) − h(a) A(0) = 0. (21)
Disregarding planned-for bequests, we obtain A(ω) = 0. The probability of surviving






µ(s,h(s), ¯ H(t0 + s))ds
￿
. (22)







−ρau(c(a))M(a,t0 + a) da
s.t. ˙ M(a) = −µ(a,h, ¯ H)M(a,t0 + a)
˙ A(a) = (r + µ(a,h, ¯ H))A(a,t0 + a) + y(a) − c(a) − h(a)
M(0,t0) = 1,A(0,t0) = 0,A(ω,t0 + ω) = 0
We have shown in the previous section that individuals do not expect to aﬀect
health care spending per capita (as averaged across each age-group) and therefore take
¯ H(t0 + a) as given at each point in time. We show in Appendix D that the individual





is satisﬁed. Hence, the individual equalises eﬀective marginal expenditure with the
PVOL, ψP(a), as deﬁned in (14). The externality has a bearing on the eﬀectiveness of
14individual health care spending and is therefore prone to shift individual spending pat-
terns. However, individuals do not take into account the beneﬁt (or harm) they bestow
on others in the case of positive (negative) spillovers. A comparison with (18) shows
immediately that individuals fail to take account of both the value of the individual’s
future contributions towards the externality and the current value of the externality.
Thus, they will under-spend (over-spend) in the case of positive (negative) externalities.
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Thus, individual consumption follows the same pattern the planner would choose. Dif-
ferences arise with regard to the life-cycle allocation of health expenditure. Comparison
with (20) shows that individuals fail to take into account the fact that health expendi-
ture should (i) decrease in line with the loss of the current year’s value of the individual’s
net contribution to the externality
ηH
uc (h − ¯ H) and (ii) change in line with changes in
the value of the externality ˙ (
ηH
uc ).
In order to attain the ﬁrst best allocation the social planner can introduce the
following tax/subsidy scheme. Let τ(a,t0 + a) denote a (net) subsidy on each unit
of private health care spending or, equivalently, on each unit of private health care
consumed. Hence, for each unit of care, the individual only spends an amount of
1 − τ(a,t0 + a). In order to balance the budget in expected terms and to deprive
the individual from any transfer income in expected terms, the government levies a
(net) lump-sum tax equal to the amount τ(a,t0 + a)h∗(a,t0 + a), where h∗(a,t0 + a)
corresponds to the socially optimal level of health expenditure for an individual aged
a at time t0 + a. Note that the lump-sum transfer is entirely exogenous to individual
decision making. The individual asset dynamics under the transfer scheme can then be
written as follows
˙ A(a) = (r + µ(a,h, ¯ H(t0 + a)))A(a,t0 + a) + y(a) − c(a) − h(a)
+τ(a,t0 + a)(h(a) − h
∗(a,t0 + a)) (24)
When deriving the transfer that induces the ﬁrst best allocation we assume a steady
state for the sole purpose of simplifying notation. In this case all variables solely depend
on age a but not on the date of birth t0. We should stress that the optimal transfer rate
reported in Proposition 2 as well as the subsequent dynamics generalize immediately
to out-of-steady-state settings.23 From the FOCs of the social welfare problem (SW)
and of the individual choice problem (IC) we then obtain
23Indeed, as regards the optimal transfer rate, the generalisation would only mean that all of the
















P(a)µh(a,h, ¯ H) + τ(a), (IC)
respectively. Here, variables superscribed with superscript ∗ correspond to the socially
eﬃcient solution. Combining the two ﬁrst-order conditions yields
τ(a) = ψ








If the transfer induces optimal health expenditure for all ages, then mortality rates
and consumption levels correspond to the socially optimal levels as well. It follows that
the PVOL component of the SVOL and the PVOL within the individual’s problem are
equalised within each age-group. The following is then easily veriﬁed (see Appendix E).
Proposition 2 Assume a steady-state. Then, the transfer
τ
∗(a) = 1 −
ψP(a)
ψP(a) + Ω(a) + Θ(a)
(26)
with Θ(a),ψP(a) and Ω(a) as deﬁned in (13), (14) and (16), respectively, induces the
optimal allocation {h(a) = h∗(a),c(a) = c∗(a)} for all a.
In order to provide some intuition about the transfer, we observe the following,




∗(a) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Θ(a) + Ω(a) ≥ 0.
Thus, the transfer constitutes a subsidy on health expenditure, with τ∗(a) ∈ [0,1] if
and only if Θ(a) + Ω(a) > 0. Generally, we would expect this to be the likely case for
positive externalities, where Θ(a) > 0. Indeed, a suﬃcient condition for a subsidy is
then given by Ω(a) ≥ 0, which is the case for an individual that continues to be a net
contributor towards the positive externality over its remaining life time. Note, however,
that this is not always guaranteed: Ω(a) < 0 cannot be ruled out if over their remaining
lifetime individuals (tend to) spend less on health care than the population average.
In the following, let us focus on the intuitive case, where for positive externalities,
we have τ∗(a) ∈ [0,1]. Here, the transfer rate represents the share of the full social
value of health care that is not internalised by the individual. The optimal transfer is
then an increasing function of the current value of the externality, Θ(a), and the value
of future contributions towards the externality, Ω(a). If externalities do not play a role,
24Note that ψP(a) + Ω(a) + Θ(a) = −µh(a)−1 > 0.
16we have µH(a) → 0 and, as is readily verifed from (13) and (16), Θ(a) + Ω(a) → 0.
Obviously, private choice then approaches the social optimum and τ∗(a) → 0. In the
other polar case mortality can only be reduced through collective expenditure ¯ H, i.e. we
have µh(a) → 0. In this case, Θ(a) → ∞ and thus τ∗(a) → 1, implying that individuals
receive health care free of charge at the point of use but have to pay a lump-sum tax
τ∗(a)h∗(a). Indeed, this is precisely the solution we would expect under circumstances
where survival is a ’pure’ public good. The intermediate situations follow immediately.
Note that for these cases we can also interpret the transfer scheme in the context of
health insurance: individuals pay a premium amounting to τ∗(a)h∗(a) and care is then
provided subject to a co-payment equal to 1 − τ∗(a).25
If Θ(a) + Ω(a) < 0 the transfer constitutes a tax on health expenditure: τ∗(a) < 0.
While this is the plausible outcome in case of negative externalities, where Θ(a) < 0,
again this is not always guaranteed. Individuals for whom health expenditure lies
below the average over their remaining life-time are no longer contributors towards the
externality (but rather receipients) and therefore receive a tax relief, where Ω(a) >
0. Again, focusing on the intuitive case, where τ∗(a) < 0 for Θ(a) < 0 it is worth
noting that the resulting tax is, nevertheless, no mirror image of the subsidy paid in
the presence of positive externalities. In particular, we note that τ∗(a) > −1 if and
only if ψP(a) > −2[Θ(a) + Ω(a)]. Hence, if the negative externality becomes strong
enough, tax rates in excess of −1 cannot be ruled out. In the limiting case, where
ψP(a) + Ω(a) + Θ(a) → 0 taxation at (close to) inﬁnite rates eﬀectively excludes the
indivdiual from the consumption of health care.
Finally, we consider the age-time proﬁle of the transfer rate. Noting that in the










we can also express the optimal transfer rate as
τ




Hence, the optimal transfer decreases in the weighted ratio of PVOL to SVOL, where
the weight [1 + ζ(a)]
−1 measures the direction and magnitude of the externality. The
following can then be veriﬁed (see Appendix F).26
25Here, we assume that the lump-sum part of the transfer (i.e. the insurance premium) is age-
speciﬁc. Note, however, that in the presence of a perfect annuity market the individual is indiﬀerent
as to when the lump-sum transfers are paid/received. One could thus equally well conceive a solution,






0 e−raM(a)da or even a
once and-for-all tax amounting to τ0 =
R ω
0 e−raM(a)τ∗(a)h∗(a)da.
26Recall that we focus on the steady state. Outside the steady state the dot-derivative (representing








accounting for the change in the value of the externality over time would have to be added.
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(ρ − r). (29)
The change of the optimal transfer rate with age and time is subject to two major
drivers. The ﬁrst term on the RHS captures the impact on the transfer rate of the change
in PVOL as opposed to SVOL for a given weight [1 + ζ(a)]
−1. Naturally, an increase
of PVOL relative to SVOL should reﬂect a decline in the transfer rate. Recalling
that SVOL contains PVOL, ψS = ψP + Ω, it follows that the change of PVOL is
oﬀset against the change in the net value of future contributions to the externality,
Ω.27 Consider, for instance, a positive externality and assume that Ω > 0, reﬂecting
a positive net contribution in the future. Noting that −(1 − τ∗) < 0 for all τ∗, it
follows that the transfer rate is then bound to decrease as long as the change in PVOL
exceeds the change in the net value of future contributions. Typically, the PVOL
declines with age from a certain age onwards (see e.g. Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984),
Murphy and Topel (2006)). This should trigger an increase in τ∗ as long as the value
of future contributions increases (or decreases by less), implying a growing shortfall
of individual health expenditure from the optimal level. In contrast, if the value of
future contributions falls faster than the PVOL, then the tax rate should be adjusted
downwards. The numerical analysis in section 5 provides further illustration of the
age-proﬁles of the various value measures and the transfer rate for the case of both
positive and negative externalities.
The second term on the RHS of (29) reﬂects changes in the weight [1 + ζ(a)]
−1 .
These are given by the change in the relative value of the externality
ηH
uc( ). As is
intuitive, an increase in the relative weight of a positive externality (exogenous and/or
through an increase in consumption for ρ < r) is reﬂected in an increase of the transfer
rate. In a steady-state (ηH
t = 0) with constant consumption (ρ = r) this eﬀect vanishes,
implying that the transfer rate is solely driven by changes in the PVOL and in the value
of future contributions, Ω.
5 Numerical Analysis
In this section we illustrate numerically the results derived in the previous sections. We
apply the following functional speciﬁcations. Per period utility is speciﬁed as




where b = 5 and σ = 2.5. Furthermore, we assume that individual income (net of
interest payments) y(a) is proxied by individual wages which, in turn, are assumed to
equal the age-speciﬁc marginal product of labour. Data on age-speciﬁc productivity
















18have been taken from Skirbekk (2005), who bases the productivity estimates on a
weighted average over 6 age-dependent abilities (numerical ability, managerial ability,
clerical perception, ﬁnger dexterity, manual dexterity, experience). Consequently the
productivity proﬁle does not represent the productivity for a special profession, but the
average over (more or less) all of them.
The maximum life-span ω is set equal to 110. Mortality data have been taken from
the human mortality data base [16] for the years 1990-2000. We model the mortality
rate according to the proportional hazard model (see Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (1980))
µ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t)) = ˜ µ(a)φ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t)), (31)
where ˜ µ(a) denotes the base mortality rate (eﬀective in the absence of any health care)
and φ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t)) describes the impact of individual and collective health spending.
While there is little evidence to guide our choice of the function φ(a,h(a,t), ¯ H(t)), it
strikes us as reasonable to assume the following properties: φh < 0,φhh > 0, φha > 0;
φ(a,0,0) = 1 (∀a) and φh(a,0,0) = −∞ (∀a). Speciﬁcally, we specify










with z = 3 and z′ = 10. The eﬃciency of individual health expenditures is decreasing
over age such that they become entirely ineﬀective for a = ω, whereas the eﬀect of
average expenditure is unrelated to age. Furthermore, for this speciﬁcation we assume
that the marginal eﬀects of individual and aggregate expenditure are unrelated. Finally,
note that positive and negative externalities are assumed to be of equal strength as
measured by |φ ¯ H| = (
p
z′ ¯ H(t))−1 for any given level of aggregate expenditure ¯ H.
All our results are calculated (i) for a steady state with a stable population and (ii)
ρ = r = 0.03.
Figure 2 plots consumption against the age-speciﬁc productivity proﬁle (the bell
shaped curve). For ρ = r it is optimal both for the individual and the social planner
to smooth consumption over all ages. Thus, as is typical for these models, individual
consumption tends to fall short of income in the youngest and oldest ages and exceeds
it over a range of intermediate ages. A comparison between individual and socially
optimal consumption reveals that, as expected, individual consumption is too high
(low) in the case of positive (negative) externalities. Correspondingly, too little (too
much) is spent on health care in the case of positive (negative) spillovers, as is revealed in
Figure 3. More generally, and for any of the cases, the age-proﬁle of health expenditure
is hump-shaped. Due to very low base mortality, for the individual there is little to be
gained from health expenditure at the youngest ages. While with advancing age, rises
in base mortality render the purchase of health care more and more eﬀective; this is
eventually oﬀset for the highest ages, where a falling PVOL and age-related declines
in eﬀectiveness, lead to a drop in expenditure. This notwithstanding, from a social
point of view, it is optimal in the presence of positive spillovers to maintain signiﬁcant
spending levels even for the youngest ages in order to ensure suﬃcient contributions
towards aggregate expenditure.
19[Figure 2 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 4 compares the total private incentive ψP in the absence of taxation vs. the
full social incentive ψS + Θ, which we will also refer to as full social value of health
care. For our speciﬁcation both the PVOL and the full social value of health care fall
with advancing age. The under- (over-) spending on health in the presence of positive
(negative) spillovers is mirrored in the valuations, where PVOL exceeds (falls short of)
the social value of health care in the presence of positive (negative) spillovers. Noting
from Figures 5 and 6 (left panel) that in the case of positive externalities the non-
private part of the social valuation Ω + Θ is positive for almost every age, it follows
that in the presence of positive externalities the PVOL component of the SVOL (given
optimal health spending h∗) must fall short of the PVOL in the presence of suboptimal
spending. This reﬂects the fact that individual mortality is ’excessive’ when positive
spillovers are not internalised, leading to a substantive premium in the willingness to
pay for survival. The converse is true in the presence of negative spillovers.
[Figure 4 about here]
[Figure 5 about here]
[Figure 6 about here]
Finally, Figure 7 plots the net increase of life expectancy at age a that is attainable
if the optimal pattern of health expenditure is induced. In the presence of positive
externalities (the upper graph), for instance, the life expectancy at age 20 would in-
crease by a little more than one year if individuals could be induced to spend optimally.
This stands in contrast to the case of negative externalities, where socially optimal be-
haviour leads to only modest increases in the remaining life expectancy for ages above
40.28 The reason is that the individual’s eﬀorts to lower own mortality are to a large
extent neutralised by the externality. Thus, the socially desirable reductions in health
care spending do not trigger a signiﬁcant increase in mortality (but neither do they
trigger a decrease in mortality). In the presence of positive externalities, in contrast,
additional individual eﬀorts combine with positive spillovers to trigger a sizeable in-
crease in life expectancy. The impact of diﬀerential health spending on mortality in the
presence of positive externalities - and its absence under negative externalities - is also
evident in the resulting consumption patterns. Consulting Figure 2, we see that the gap
between socially and individually optimal consumption is larger in the case of positive
externality. Here, socially optimal consumption is lower both due to larger expenditures
on health and due to the fact that consumption needs to be spread across additional
28Indeed, a scrutinous look at the data shows that for ages below 30, the remaining life expectancy in
the social optimum lies (by a very small amount) below the life expectancy in the case of individually
optimal spending. This is the case because from a social point of view, it is optimal to spend close to
nothing for the very young ages. The resulting increase in mortality for these age groups is more than
compensated for by the reductions in mortality for the ages 30+.
20life-years with low income (thus forcing lower levels of per-period consumption).29 In
the presence of negative spillovers, the eﬀect through changes in life-expectancy is vir-
tually absent, so that the gap in consumption levels predominantly reﬂects excessive
individual spending on health care. Indeed, in the presence of negative spillovers, the
individual’s eﬀorts to curb own mortality are ineﬀective from some point and only serve
to lower consumption: a treadmill-eﬀect.
[Figure 7 about here]
Figure 5 develops the age-proﬁle of the net value of an individual’s contributions
towards the externality over its remaining life time. This value is positive (negative)
for all but the highest ages in the case of positive (negative) spillovers. Surprisingly,
perhaps, this implies that although individual spending levels exceed the population
average only for a range of intermediate life years, in terms of discounted value, the
individual tends to be a net contributor towards the externality for all but the highest
life years. The hump-shaped spending pattern implies a maximum (minimum) value
of future contributions in the case of positive (negative) externalities. As individuals
spend less than the population average within their last few life years, the value of future
contributions turns negative (positive) in the case of positive (negative) externalities
and eventually approaches zero. However, owing to only a few life years left at this
point, the absolute values are very low. Finally, we note that in comparison to the
PVOL and the current value of the externality, Θ, the value of future contributions is
rather modest for all ages. Thus, what is predominantly driving the wedge between
PVOL and the social value of health expenditure is the current value of the externality.
The latter is plotted in Figure 6 and has a more straightforward shape. Recall
that for an optimal expenditure path h∗(a) it must be true that Θ(a) = ζψS(a), where
for a steady-state with ρ = r, the weight ζ, as deﬁned in (27), is a positive (negative)
constant in the presence of positive (negative) externalities. Then, as ψS(a) is declining
with age, so is the absolute value of Θ(a). What is striking, however, is that in absolute
terms, the current value of a negative externality is about three times that of a positive
externality. This is predominantly reﬂecting higher overall levels of mortality (even
under optimal investment) in the presence of negative externalities, which in turn lead
to a higher SVOL. Recall from (13) that Θ(a) includes the aggregated SVOL of all age
groups aﬀected by the externality. Thus, higher mortality must lead to a higher current
valuation of the externality.
Finally, consider the age-proﬁle of the optimal transfer, as in Figure 8, plotting
absolute and relative (with respect to the transfer level at age 20) values. A ﬁrst
inspection shows that, unsurprisingly, the transfer constitutes a subsidy (tax) in the
presence of positive (negative) spillovers. Noting that ζ (and, thus,
ηH
uc ) is a constant,
it follows from (29) that the age-proﬁle of the transfer is entirely driven by changes
of the PVOL as opposed to the discounted value of future contributions towards the
externality, Ω. In the case of positive externalities, the decline in PVOL suggests a
29Naturally, this eﬀect would reverse if income was to exceed expenditure for the life-years gained.
21tendency towards an increase in the transfer. Indeed, up to around age 60 this trend is
complemented by the increase in the value of future contributions, both widening the
wedge between private and social incentives. For higher ages, however, a sharp decline
in the value of future contributions becomes dominant, thus leading to a closing gap in
incentives and, thus, a reduction in the subsidy. In the case of negative externalities,
the decline in PVOL would suggest a tendency towards a reduction in the tax (as the
private incentive to over-spend is mitigated). Up to around age 90, however, this trend
is dominated by the increasingly negative value of future contributions towards the
externality. Indeed, between ages 20 and 90 there is almost a tripling of the tax rate,
which only afterwards is reduced sharply, where a decline in the (absolute) value of the
contributions now reinforces the tendency towards lower taxation.
[Figure 8 about here]
A further comparison between the transfer under positive and negative externalities
reveals that for negative externalities (i) the absolute value of the transfer tends to be
greater by two orders of magnitude;30 and (ii) life-cycle variation in the transfer is much
more pronounced.31 The diﬀerence in absolute values (i) reﬂects two distinguishing
features of the two types of externalities. First, in the presence of positive externalities
PVOL is complemented by a term Θ + Ω > 0 to form the full social value of health
care. But then, PVOL is bound to be smaller than the full social value of health
care (justifying at best subsidisation at rate 1). In contrast, for negative externalities
the social incentive embraces a term Θ + Ω < 0 oﬀsetting PVOL, implying that the
full social value of care is necessarily smaller than PVOL. While in and of itself this
does not imply very high rates of taxation, it shows that, to some extent, the policy-
maker needs strong taxes to reverse private incentives, whereas in the case of positive
externalities, even moderate subsidies complement the private incentive. Second, as
was discussed previously, the current value of the externality (in absolute terms) |Θ|
is signiﬁcantly higher in the presence of negative externalities. This reﬂects the higher
levels of mortality in the presence of negative externalities, translating into a larger gap
between private and social incentives and, therefore, calling for a stronger policy.
At last, consider (ii) the striking diﬀerence in the age-variation of the transfers.
From Figure 3 we see that in the case of positive externalities, individually and socially
optimal expenditure converge with advancing age. The gap between private and social
incentive being largest at age 20, this is corrected by a subsidy, which at this age provides
a signﬁcant spending incentive. With advancing age, individual spending incentives are
increasingly driven by a seizable eﬀect on mortality (as captured by an increasing |µh|)
30The focus should lie on the comparison of transfer levels between the two types of externalities
and not on the levels in their own right. A tax rate of up to 300 per cent, as in the case of negative
externalities, is clearly unrealistic and solely down to our (arbitrary) choice of the parameter z′ in the
speciﬁcation (32). We should stress, however, that the diﬀerence in magnitudes is systematic.
31In the presence of positive externalities the diﬀerence between the subsidy at age 20 and its
maximum amounts to a mere 8 per cent, whereas in the presence of negative externalities the diﬀerence
between the tax at age 20 and its maximum amounts to 200 per cent.
22leading to the socially desired boost in spending even if the transfer is kept constant.
Thus, few policy adjustments are required to lead to a convergence of incentives. In
contrast, Figure 3 reveals for negative externalities a considerable gap between privately
and socially optimal expenditure for most ages including the age-groups with peak
spending. Especially, for these age-groups the incentives for individuals to curb their
high spending levels have to be signiﬁcant, thus, requiring large increases in the tax
rate.
6 Conclusions
We provide a framework for assessing the eﬃciency of the individual consumption of
health care within a continuous-time life-cycle framework assuming that health care
curbs own mortality but also induces a spill over eﬀect on other person’s survival. To
this end we combine an age-structured optimal control model at the population level
with a conventional life-cycle model.
We show analytically how the planner (but not the individual) incorporates in her
decision making the value of the externality. Referring to the concept of the willingness
to pay for a small reduction of the mortality rate, i.e. the value of life, we compare
the social and private incentive to spend on health care. We show that the social value
of life comprises the private value of life and, in addition, the individual’s (net) future
contribution toward social welfare through the spillovers from individual consumption
of health care. Adding to the social value of life the current value of the externality,
as generated by current individual health care spending, results in the full social value
of health care, which in optimum is equalised with the eﬀective cost of life-saving.
We derive analytically the age-proﬁles of consumption (following the usual pattern)
and, more interestingly, of health expenditure. With regard to the latter we can trace
out explicitly how it develops depending on changes related to the eﬀects of age and
aggregate expenditure on the ’eﬀectiveness of care’ and to changes in the underlying
valuations.
From a comparison of the individual and social incentive we derive a the net transfer
from the planner to the individual that induces the individual to consume health care
at the socially eﬃcient level. The optimal transfer rate amounts to the proportion of
the external value of health care relative to its full social value (including in addition
the private value of life). We examine analytically the properties of this transfer, in
particular its age dependency both for the case of positive and negative externalities.
The age-pattern of the transfer depends, in particular, on the change of the private value
of life relative to the value of future contributions to the externality, as moderated by
the direction of the externality.
We illustrate the main ﬁndings of our model through numerical illustrations. The
nature of the externality turns out to have distinct consequences for the pattern of mor-
tality. In the presence of positive spillovers mortality can be reduced signiﬁcantly with
corresponding increases in life-expectancy. However, owing to their under-spending
23individuals fail to realise a signiﬁcant share of these gains in life-expectancy. In con-
trast, when spillovers are negative, no substantial reductions in mortality below the
baseline can be attained. Here, the ineﬃciency of individual behaviour is manifested
in a tread-mill eﬀect, where individuals over-spend on health care without great eﬀect
and, thereby, forego consumption. Finally, we plot age-proﬁles of the optimal transfer
rate, of the private value of life, the full social value of health care, as well as of the
current and future values of individual health spending. Our results indicate that for
negative externalities the value of the transfer tends to be greater and to exhibit a more
pronounced life cycle pattern as compared to the transfer under positive externalities.
It has been our main objective to provide a modelling framework to analyse the
eﬃciency of individual life-cycle behaviour, to present the critical elements of such an
analysis and to illustrate the channels of transmission by which direct period eﬀects
and eﬀects through changes in the life-expectancy impact on life-cycle choice. In order
to facilitate the representation as much as possible we have therefore adopted a num-
ber of simplifying assumptions regarding the nature of the externalities. In particular,
by assuming that the spillovers ﬂow through the current aggregate health care expen-
diture we presume (i) that all age-groups contribute in a symmetric way and, more
importantly, (ii) that there are no cumulative eﬀects of spending, as would be present
in the context of stock externalities. For our numerical analysis, we impose additional
assumptions, namely that the marginal productivity of individual health expenditure
is unaﬀected by the externality and that the impact of the externaltity on mortality is
independent of age. Clearly, these assumptions are unrealistic and compromise a direct
application of our results to the various examples of real-world externalities that were
discussed in the introduction. Nevertheless, we have identiﬁed a number of important
drivers behind the life-cycle transmission of survival-related externalities that generalize
to more realistic settings. While there is apparent scope for drawing up more realistic
models of life-cycle externalities, we leave this to future research.
Finally, our model lends itself to the analysis of other imperfections in individual
behaviour. The cross-cohort spillovers that give rise to ineﬃciency are clearly not only
present in the health care sector but also - and perhaps more prominently - in the
production and/or consumption of goods. Externalities in production arise with regard
to saving towards the accumulation of a (common) capital stock that aﬀects the pro-
ductivity of (everyone’s) labour; and with regard to health or educational investments
that increase individual productivity but also the productivity of co-workers. Exter-
nalities with regard to consumption arise for many modes of unhealthy consumption
(see Forster, 2001, for a life-cycle-model of unhealthy consumption without spillovers).
Most prominently this relates to smoking which not only raises individual mortality but
also the mortality of others. Similar arguments apply, however, to other consumption
goods, such as cars, that directly or indirectly lead to the emission of pollutants. As
should have become evident from our analysis, such externalities will lead to distortions
both due to period eﬀects and through eﬀects in overall life-expectancy. We would thus
envisage a number of interesting applications.
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27A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1





t = (ρ + µ(a,h, ¯ H))ξ
N − u(c) − ξ
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From now on, we assume T < +∞, which further implies ξN(a,T) = 0. In or-
der to obtain transversality conditions for ξA, we have to consider the conditions
A(a,0) = A0(a), A(a,T) = AT(a), A(0,t) = 0 and A(ω,t) = 0. For age-speciﬁc
optimal control models with initial and end state conditions there are no transversal-
ity conditions. Thus we ignore A(ω,t) = 0 and A(a,T) = AT(a) and add the terms
−λ
R T
0 e−rtA(ω,t)2 dt and −λ
R ω
0 e−rT(A(a,T) − AT(a))2 da to the objective function.
Thus we obtain ξA(ω,t) = −2λA(ω,t) > 0 and ξA(a,T) = −2λ(A(a,T) − AT(a)) as
transversality conditions (implying ξA(a,t) > 0 for ∀(a,t)). The necessary ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to the controls c and h are given by
Hc = uc(c)N − ξ
AN = 0
Hh = −ξ
Nµh(a,h, ¯ H)N − ξ
AN + η
HN = 0










S(a,t) + Θ(a,t), (37)













µ ¯ H(b a,h, ¯ H)
µh(a,h, ¯ H)
db a
where the second equality follows when inserting from (35) and using ξN (b a,t) =
uc(c(b a,t))ψS(b a,t).32
32Note the change in notation from a to b a, where a refers to the age-group for which the optimality
condition holds and b a refers to all other age-groups.
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ds
where we make use of the fact that ξN(ω,t) = 0 for every t. Using the deﬁnition in (15)
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￿
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￿
H(t − a + s) − h(s,t − a + s)
￿
ds
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￿










a[r+µ(s′,h, ¯ H)]ds′ Θ(s,t − a + s)
ψS(s,t − a + s) + Θ(s,t − a + s)
×
￿










ψ∗(s,t−a+s)+Θ(s,t−a+s), as can be checked from the second
equation in (37).
29C Appendix: Derivation of the dynamics of h
From the necessary ﬁrst order condition expressed in value terms, i.e. (37), we obtain











are observed. Total diﬀerentiation in direction (a,t) yields
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ct), inserting from (19) and cancelling terms. Inserting in (40) we obtain the assertion.
D Appendix: The individual optimum
The Hamiltonian of the individual problem (page 14 ﬀ) reads (again omitting a if it is
not of particular importance)
H = u(c)M − λMµ(a,h,H)M + λA((r + µ(a,h))A + y − c − h)
30where λM and λA denote the adjoint variables of the survival probability and individual
assets respectively. From the necessary optimality conditions we can derive the following
system of adjoint variables:
˙ λM = (ρ + µ(a,h,H))λM − u(c) (44)
˙ λA = (ρ − r − µ(a,h,H))λA
with the transversality conditions λM(ω) = 0 and λA(ω) = −2λA(ω), since we imple-
ment the terminal condition A = 0 in the same way as in the planner’s problem. Thus
both adjoint variables are always positive. The necessary ﬁrst order conditions are
Hc = ucM − λA = 0 (45)
Hh = −(λMM − λAA)µh − λA = 0
Combining them we obtain
ucM = −(λMM − λAA)µh
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e(ρ−r)(s−a) and employing deﬁnition (15). The last inequality follows by deﬁnition (14).
E Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
An optimal transfer induces spending levels h(a) = h∗(a) ∀a. In turn, this implies






















31Furthermore, note that h(a) = h∗(a) and µh(a,h, ¯ H) = µh(a,h∗, ¯ H∗) imply c(a) =
c∗(a). Using the deﬁnition ψS(a) = ψP(a)+Ω(a) together with c(a) = c∗(a) and h(a) =
h∗(a) we can then write τ∗(a) = −[Ω(a) + Θ(a)]µh(a,h∗, ¯ H∗). Substituting from the
ﬁrst-order condition (18) µh(a,h∗, ¯ H∗) =
￿
ψP(a) + Ω(a) + Θ(a)
￿−1 and rearranging we
then obtain the expression reported in the Proposition.
F Appendix: Derivation of the dynamics of τ
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Figure 1: Lexis diagram


























Figure 2: Consumption in the social planner and the individual choice model




















Figure 3: Individual and average health expenditures in the social planner and the
individual choice model




















Figure 4: ψP vs. ψS + Θ





















































Figure 7: Diﬀerence in life-expectancy
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